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INTRODUCTION
In August 2010, Foxconn, one of the world’s largest
electronics producing companies located in China, threw a
seemingly inconspicuous parade for its employees as part of an
effort to ‘boost’ their morale.1 Prior to the parade, at least nine
1. See Tom Randall, Inside Apple’s Foxconn Factories, BLOOMBERG slide 3 (Mar. 30,
2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/slideshow/2012-03-30/inside-apple-sfoxconn-factory.html (depicting the employee parade at Foxconn’s Longhua campus);
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Foxconn employees had committed suicide within a span of
three months.2 In fact, since 2007, some sources have reported
that at least seventeen Foxconn employees have committed or
attempted to commit suicide.3
Since reports of these suicides went public, Foxconn
became the subject of multiple exposés and investigations
looking at the inner workings of their factories.4 A majority of
the reports have found that the combination of excessive
overtime hours, unsafe working conditions, and inadequately
training employees on how to handle toxic chemicals
transformed Foxconn factories into exceedingly dangerous, and
possibly deadly, environments for their employees.5
see also Frederik Balfour & Tim Culpan, The Man Who Makes Your iPhone, BUSINESSWEEK
MAG., Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_38/b419
5058423479.htm (discussing how the parade was a “joint production of employee
unions and management . . . as part of an effort to mend the collective psyche of a
Chinese workforce”).
2. See Joel Johnson, 1 Million Workers. 90 Million iPhones. 17 Suicides. Who’s to
Blame?, WIRED MAG. (Feb. 28, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/
2011/02/ff_joelinchina/all (discussing the suicides that occurred at the Foxconn
factory in Shenzhen and other parts of China); see also Randall, supra note 1, slide 9
(discussing how at least ten workers committed suicide in 2010).
3. See Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an
iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/
ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all
(discussing that at least eighteen Foxconn workers have attempted suicide or “fell from
buildings in manners that suggested suicide attempts”); see also Johnson, supra note 2
(noting that some sources indicate that seventeen Foxconn workers have killed
themselves since 2006, although Foxconn has disputed a few of the cases).
4. See, e.g., Liu Zhiyi, The Fate of a Generation of Workers: Foxconn Undercover,
ENGADGET (Richard Lai trans., May 19, 2010, 7:03 PM), http://www.engadget.com/
2010/05/19/the-fate-of-a-generation-of-workers-foxconn-undercover-fully-tr/
(describing the experience of an undercover reporter at a Foxconn factory); Johnson,
supra note 2 (describing the author’s tour of a Foxconn plant in Shenzhen after the
suicides); Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (describing workers’ experiences in a
Foxconn factory as part of a series on challenges posed by “globalized high-tech
industries”); FAIR LAB. ASS’N, FINAL FOXCONN VERIFICATION STATUS REPORT (Dec.
2013), http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/final_foxconn
_verification_report_0.pdf (detailing the Fair Labor Association’s extensive
investigation of Apple’s supply-chain factories in China).
5 . See STUDENTS & SCHOLARS AGAINST CORP. MISBEHAVIOUR, FOXCONN AND
APPLE FAIL TO FULFILL PROMISES: PREDICAMENTS OF WORKERS AFTER THE SUICIDES 3
(May 6, 2011), http://sacom.hk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2011-05-06_foxconnand-apple-fail-to-fulfill-promises.pdf (examining and summarizing their findings of
working conditions at Foxconn factories); see also Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3
(discussing how Foxconn employees work excessive overtime, often in “onerous work
environments and serious—sometimes deadly—safety problems”).
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Foxconn is one of Apple’s most important manufacturers
because of the company’s ability to produce massive quantities
of consumer electronic products like iPhones and iPads.6 Due to
Apple’s close affiliation with Foxconn, the US tech giant was
subjected to harsh criticism for failing to realize that one of their
leading supply-chain factories engaged in labor rights violations
egregious enough to cause workers to commit suicide. 7 In
response to the suicides and growing media attention, Foxconn
added around three million meters of netting to the sides of
their buildings to discourage future suicide attempts and set up
employee counseling centers.8
Although it is unclear to what extent Apple was aware of
these labor violations occurring within their supply chains, the
Foxconn-Apple scandal brought to the forefront interesting
questions about accountability. Is Apple liable for the labor
practices used by factories located in China? Further, should
Apple be held liable? In more generalized terms, should a
corporation be held responsible for possible human rights
violations occurring in one of their supply-chains located in
another jurisdiction?
The Supreme Court of the United States in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Company addressed the question of whether a
company should be liable for human rights violations when such
violations (1) occur extraterritorially and (2) another party

6. See Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (stating that Foxconn is one of Apple’s
“most important manufacturing partners” because of its ability to manufacture
“sufficient numbers of iPhones and iPads”); see also Johnson, supra note 2 (discussing
how Foxconn, a partner of Apple, manufactures most of the world’s consumerelectronics products).
7. See Scott Sterling, How Apple’s Foxconn Problem Is Like Nike’s Sweatshop Problem,
and Why the Outcome Is the Same, DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 10, 2012), http://
www.digitaltrends.com/apple/how-apples-foxconn-problem-is-like-nikes-sweatshopproblem-and-why-the-outcome-is-the-same (comparing Apple’s Foxconn situation to
the 1990s Nike sweatshop scandal); see also Susan Adams, Apple’s New Foxconn
Embarrassment, FORBES (Sep. 12, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
susanadams/2012/09/12/apples-new-foxconn-embarrassment (reporting how Apple is
facing criticism amidst the launch of its new iPhone 5 because “of the labor practices
that go into making Apple’s popular products”).
8. See Randall, supra note 1, slide 9 (depicting Foxconn’s anti-suicide nets and
discussing how Foxconn hired mental health professionals after the 2010 suicides); see
also Johnson, supra note 2 (discussing Foxconn’s anti-suicide nets and its online
counseling facilities).
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commits these violations.9 In Kiobel, the plaintiffs were residents
of Ogoniland, a region located in Nigeria, and the defendants
named in the case were the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
and the Shell Transport and Trading Company.10 Throughout
the early 1990s, the Nigerian Army purportedly beat, raped,
murdered, and arrested Ogoniland residents as well as destroyed
and looted their property. 11 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants violated the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) by aiding
and abetting the Nigerian Army by providing them with food,
transportation, and compensation.12
The Supreme Court ultimately found for the defendants
and held that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, in part
because, “there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make
the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the
enforcement of international norms”. 13 Prior to Kiobel, lower
courts used the ATS as a way to hold corporations liable for
violating customary international human rights law.14 The Kiobel
decision now makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to hold
corporations liable for human rights violations occurring
outside the United States unless the claims “touch and concern”
the United States with “sufficient force.”15

9. See 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
10. Id. at 1662.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1662–63; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (providing that courts “shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”).
13. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668–69.
14. See Joel Slawotsky, ATS Liability for Rogue Banking in a Post-Kiobel World, 37
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 130 (2014) (reviewing how previous Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”) cases alleged that corporations engaged or were complicit in acts of
extrajudicial execution, torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity); see also Alien
Tort Statute—Extraterritoriality—Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 127 HARV. L. REV.
308, 308 (2013) [hereinafter ATS-Extraterritoriality] (describing how the ATS has been
used by “foreign victims of human rights abuses seeking to vindicate their rights under
international law in U.S. courts”).
15. See ATS-Extraterritoriality, supra note 14, at 311 (summarizing how, after Kiobel,
the ATS may only be invoked if “the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States . . . with sufficient force”); see also Slawotsky, supra note 14, at 132–33
(discussing how the ATS may only be invoked if a claim “touches and concerns” the
United States with “sufficient force”).

1220 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1215
Kiobel is an example of the possible issues that could arise in
tandem with the globalization of businesses.16 When a company
is engaged in activities abroad that could give rise to human
rights violations, their activities touch on questions of liability,
jurisdiction, and regulatory authority. These questions will
continue to persist as multinational corporations (“MNCs”)
become more interested in doing business abroad. 17 Thus,
although fifty years ago it may have been odd to discuss the
effects MNCs’ foreign direct investment (“FDI”) have on human
rights, globalization has made this an increasingly pressing
issue.18
Additionally, the advent of bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”) has provided immense protections for MNCs’
investments into other countries. 19 A BIT is an agreement
between two signatory states generally geared towards protecting
the rights of investors in order to encourage the flow of FDI

16 . See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving
International Agenda, 101 A.J.I.L. 819, 824 (2007) (describing the difficulty of regulating
multinational corporations because of the different sets of laws that could apply to
these entities). See generally Symposium, The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate
Citizen, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2001) (providing an overview of the
challenges posed by corporations operating in multiple jurisdictions).
17. See Kevin Kolben, Wal-Mart Is Coming, but It’s Not All Bad: Wal-Mart and Labor
Rights in its International Subsidiaries, 12 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 275, 278 (2007)
(“As countries have liberalized their [foreign direct investment] regulations, foreign
[multinational corporations] have been rapidly increasing their investment and
operations, particularly in emerging markets, such as China and India.”); see also Steve
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J.
443, 459 (2001) (discussing how foreign investment by corporations has “significantly
outpaced growth in international trade” because of the protections provided by
international investment treaties and agreements).
18 . See David Shea Bettwy, The Human Rights and Wrongs of Foreign Direct
Investment: Addressing the Need For an Analytical Framework, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS.
239, 241–43 (2012) (summarizing the effects that foreign direct investment by
multinational corporations have on human rights); see also Symposium, The
Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing briefly
the role multinational companies play in relation to an international civil society).
19. See Come and Get Me, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.economist.com/
node/21547836 (reporting that Argentina, after facing an economic collapse in 2001,
paid US$400 million in arbitration awards to MNC investors that sued Argentina under
a BIT); see also Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to
Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 484 (2011) (describing how MNCinvestors’ bargaining power is strengthened by BITs because these instruments provide
them with minimum standards of protection).
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between the two nations.20 Under a BIT, if a government acts
and this action affects the value of an investor’s FDI, the investor
has the right to initiate arbitration proceedings against the state
and hold it financially liable for their economic losses.21 For
example, in the early 2000s, multiple investors filed over forty
arbitration claims worth hundreds of millions of dollars against
the state of Argentina after the country defaulted due to a
massive financial collapse.22 Although the investors do have a
right to recover for this depreciation in their investment,
Argentina has protested that paying all of the investors would
force the country into a second default.23 BITs have also been
invoked to protect the value of an MNC’s investment even if
doing so could cause massive layoffs and reduce job security for
state employees.24 In both of these examples, although BITs are
20. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 484 (outlining a BIT’s structure and purpose of
encouraging Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) between the two signatory-states); see
also Mary E. Footer, BITs and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation
of Foreign Investment, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 33, 36–39 (2009) (describing how
investment treaties have developed towards promoting and protecting foreign
investment).
21. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 407, 408 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010)
(reporting how a number of investors filed million dollar arbitration claims against
Argentina in 2001 even though the state was in the throes of an economic collapse); see
also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 496 (providing a brief overview of how the threat of
arbitration proceedings from an MNC can stifle a state’s regulatory power).
22 . See Footer, supra note 20, at 40–41 (discussing how, after Argentina’s
economic crisis in the early 2000s, Argentina faced liabilities estimated up to US$80
billion); see also Ken Parks, Argentina Reaches $677M Investment Dispute Settlement—
Government, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BTCO-20131018-705467.html (reporting that Argentina agreed to a US$677 million
settlement with investors who brought arbitration proceedings against the state as a
result of Argentina’s default).
23. See Parks, supra note 22 (reporting that Argentina’s president is negotiating
with investors to settle their claims or risk defaulting the state a second time); see also
Argentina Tries to Delay $1.3bn Repayment to Creditors, BBC (Feb. 19, 2014, 2:28 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26225135 (stating that if Argentina’s petition to
stall its creditor repayments fails, another default could occur).
24. Petition to Arbitral Tribunal by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers & of
the Council of Canadians, In the Matter of a Claim under Chapter 11, Section B of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada,
Petition to the Tribunal 7–8 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ups-04.pdf
(arguing
that, in an arbitration proceeding between Canada and an MNC, a decision in favor of
the MNC would force Canada to restructure their national postal service, which could
seriously impact workers by causing major layoffs and affecting job security).
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purely commercial instruments, they have been invoked in a way
that challenges a state’s authority to regulate in areas that affect
the wider public.25
In July 2013, the United States and China announced that
they were in “substantive negotiations” to finalize a US-China
BIT.26 If a US-China BIT is finalized, it is likely that FDI will
increase between the two nations.27 Whether or not a US-China
BIT would negatively affect China’s regulatory authority remains
unclear. China, however, already has such a notorious
reputation for insufficiently protecting workers that it is widely
known as the “world’s sweatshop.” 28 The recent Foxconn
scandal helped to again highlight this history of permitting
abusive labor practices, particularly in factories that produce
products for MNCs.29 This history of poor worker protection,
25. See Footer, supra note 20, at 41 (summarizing investor-state arbitration cases
that affected non-commercial areas, such as access to water, environmental, and public
health concerns); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 492 (discussing how developing
states enter into BITs without fully understanding how the treaty could constrain the
state’s regulatory power).
26. See Chen Weihua, Key Investment Talks to Restart, CHINADAILY USA (July 13,
2013, 12:57 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-07/13/content_1677
0015.htm (discussing how the United States and China agreed to restart negotiations
for a BIT); see also Betsy Bourassa, U.S. and China Breakthrough Announcement on the
Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (July 15, 2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-BreakthroughAnnouncement-.aspx (reporting that the United States and China have restarted BIT
negotiations).
27. See US-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, EVALUATING A POTENTIAL USCHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: BACKGROUND, CONTEXT, AND IMPLICATIONS 11
(Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1738&context=key_workplace (explaining how the creation of a BIT
generally leads to an increase in FDI between the two signatory nations); see also
Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (describing how foreign investment and BITs have grown
in tandem).
28. See Joseph Kay, China: Trouble in the World’s Sweatshop, LIBCOM (Aug. 23, 2010,
2:45 PM), http://libcom.org/news/china-trouble-worlds-sweatshop-23082010 (“For
nearly three decades, corporations have increasingly relocated manufacturing to China
to take advantage of a vast supply of cheap labour and lax regulation.”); see also CHINA
LABOR WATCH, TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TRUTH BEHIND ELECTRONICS
SWEATSHOPS 107 (2012) [hereinafter TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION], available at
http://chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/20110712.pdf (comparing factories in China to
“sweatshops previously found in 19th century industrial England”).
29 . See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 1 (explaining how
explosions in Chinese factories have been common for the past decade); see also David
Barboza, In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html?
pagewanted=all (stating that despite nearly a decade’s worth of efforts “to eliminate
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combined with MNCs’ use of BITs to fiercely protect their
economic interests, could indicate that a US-China BIT may
prove catastrophic for any labor rights movement in China.30 If a
US-China BIT is signed and finalized, this Comment argues that
it should contain strong provisions that place affirmative duties
on signatory-nations and MNC investors to staunchly protect
workers’ rights, as well as provide the state and investors with an
avenue through which to enforce these obligations.
Part I describes China’s labor and employment laws,
relevant international labor standards promulgated by the
International Labour Organization (“ILO”), and the
international investment regime. Part II first discusses how
factories in China, particularly those in contract with MNCs,
regularly violate labor and employment laws, and then discusses
how BITs have primarily been used to protect the interests of
MNC investors. Lastly, Part III argues that BITs should
incorporate stronger provisions safeguarding and upholding
workers’ rights that could be used to hold MNCs liable for
causing labor rights violations, directly or indirectly.
I. BACKGROUND ON CHINA’S LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAWS, ILO “SOFT LAW” STANDARDS, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME
This Part lays out the background of relevant labor and
employment laws in force in China, as well as the basic structure
of investment treaties. Part I.A provides background information
on the 1994 Labor Law. Part I.B then discusses China’s changes
to their employment laws in 2008. Parts I.C and I.D detail the
Trade Union Law and China’s regulations of collective
contracts, respectively. Part I.E next describes relevant labor
standards promulgated by the ILO. Lastly, Part I.F provides a
sweatshop labor conditions in Asia, worker abuse is still commonplace in many of the
Chinese factories that supply Western companies”).
30 . See CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN: DEPLORABLE WORKING
CONDITIONS CHARACTERIZE APPLE’S ENTIRE SUPPLY CHAIN 3 (2012) [hereinafter CHINA
LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN], available at http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/
2012627-5.pdf (concluding that “serious work-related injuries and worker suicides” are
pervasive throughout Apple’s factories in China); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 484
(discussing how BITs empower MNCs because MNCs could use the “threat of a multimillion dollar adverse arbitration decision” to pressure states into placating MNCs and
their economic interests).
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brief history of the development of international investment
agreements.
A. China’s 1994 Labor Law
In 1994, China passed its first law regulating employer and
employee relationships. 31 The 1994 Labor Law requires an
individual employment contract to be signed whenever an
employer and employee relationship is created. 32 These
employment contracts are required to contain generalized
provisions pertaining to a job’s duration, its responsibilities,
wages, and workplace safety guarantees.33 Employment contracts
must also have provisions detailing disciplinary proceedings,
conditions for termination, and consequences for violating the
contract.34
The 1994 Labor Law also outlines the substantive
requirements of employment contracts.35 For instance, the law
generally provides that the “State shall implement a system of
guaranteed minimum wages” and that a worker’s wages “shall
not be lower than the local standards of minimum wages.”36 The
law also states that workers are not permitted to work more than

31 . See Virginia Harper Ho, From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at
Implementation Under China’s New Labor Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 45–46
(2009) (“The foundation of modern Chinese labor and employment law is the national
Labor Law, which took effect on January 1, 1995.”); see also Baogang Guo, China’s Labor
Standards: Myths and Realities, CHINA RESEARCH CENTER 2 (Feb. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.academia.edu/165449/Chinas_Labor_Standards_Myths_and_Realities
(“The Labor Act of 1994 is the first comprehensive labor standards law in China.”).
32. 1994 Laodong Fa (
) [1994 Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) P.R.C. LAWS & REGS
art. 16, translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_
1383754.htm (“A labour contract shall be concluded where a labour relationship is to
be established.”).
33. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 19 (listing clauses that must be included in
an employment contract, including clauses on the job’s duration, the job’s
responsibilities, and working conditions).
34. Id. (requiring employment contracts to include clauses relating to disciplinary
proceedings, conditions for terminating the contract, and the sanctions for violating
the contract).
35 . Id. arts. 36–65 (outlining the substantive requirements for employment
contract provisions, such as provisions on wages, working hours, and workplace safety
standards).
36. Id. art. 48 (stating that employees shall not be paid a wage lower than the
state’s minimum wage).
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eight hours per day or more than forty-four hours per week.37 In
cases where an employer needs to extend working hours, the
employer may do so after consulting with the labor union and
the workers.38 Overtime must not exceed thirty-six hours per
month but exceptions are allowed for unexpected circumstances
like a natural disaster.39 The 1994 Labor Law also states that the
employment contract should specify the job’s duration as either
a fixed term, non-fixed term, or based on the completion of a
specific project.40
The 1994 Labor Law provides workers with additional
rights. Under the 1994 Law, for example, workers have a right to
rest, to take vacations, and a right to work in an environment
that is safe and does not endanger their health.41 Workers also
have the right to participate in and organize labor unions that
must “represent and safeguard the legitimate rights and
interests of all labourers.”42 Through unionization, workers have
the right to negotiate with employers on “equal footing.” 43
Further, workers have the right to request assistance and
support from a labor union in arbitration or court proceedings
over wrongful termination claims.44 Workers also have the right
to engage in collective negotiations with the employer to create
a collective contract. 45 These collective contracts set out
minimum standards pertaining to wages, working hours, rest
hours, vacations, and workplace safety requirements that each
37. Id. art. 36 (“The State shall practise a working hour system wherein labourers
shall work for no more than eight hours a day and no more than 44 hours a week on
the average.”).
38. Id. art. 41 (allowing employers to extend working hours after consulting with
the labor union and the workers).
39. Id. arts. 41–42 (permitting employees to work only one overtime hour per day
and a maximum of thirty-six overtime hours per month, with exceptions for certain
extenuating circumstances, such as a natural disaster or a slow-down in production that
would affect the public interest).
40. Id. art. 20 (“The term of a labour contract is classified into fixed term, nonfixed term and the completion of a specific assignment as a term.”).
41. Id. art. 3 (stating that workers shall have the right to rest, to take vacations,
and to a safe and healthy workplace environment).
42. Id. arts. 7–8 (giving workers the right to participate in and organize labor
unions and requiring unions to represent workers’ rights and interests).
43. Id. (requiring employers to negotiate on “equal footing” with employees).
44. Id. art. 30 (giving workers the right to receive assistance and support from
labor unions in arbitrations or lawsuits over wrongful termination claims).
45. Id. art. 33 (stating that workers have the right to negotiate for a collective
contract with employers).
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individual employment contract must meet.46 In other words, an
individual employment contract cannot contain clauses that are
less protective than the ones contained in a collective contract.47
Lastly, the new law provides that workers have the right to
initiate proceedings in a mediation committee, an arbitration
committee, or a court, should any dispute arise between the
worker and employer.48
To ensure compliance, the 1994 Labor Law imposes
obligations on both employers and the Ministry of Labor and
Social Security (“MLSS”), China’s administrative department of
labor. The MLSS is charged with regulating and managing
workers and their relationships with employers.49 Employers are
expected to establish new workplace rules that comply with the
1994 Labor Law. 50 The MLSS must also take steps to help
enforce compliance with the law in order to adequately protect
workers against employers.51 Specifically, the MLSS must ensure
that employers are complying with the new law and it is required
to address and rectify situations in which a violation does
occur.52 For example, the MLSS can issue a warning and order
the employer to provide compensation to any worker harmed by
an employment law violation. 53 Further, employers who use
46. Id. (listing out the terms that may be included in a collective contract, such as
provisions on wages, work hours, workplace safety requirements, rest, and vacation).
47. Id. art. 35 (“The standards of working conditions and labour remuneration
agreed upon in labour contracts concluded between individual labourers and the
enterprise shall not be lower than those stipulated in the collective contract.”).
48. Id. art. 79 (giving workers the right to resolve disputes with their employers in
a mediation or arbitration tribunal and, as a last resort, to bring the dispute to a court
if any party is unsatisfied with the mediation or arbitration decision).
49 . Ministry of Labor and Social Security, GOV.CN, http://english.gov.cn/200510/02/content_74185.htm (“The [MLSS] . . . is in charge of labor force management,
labor relationship readjustment, various items of social insurance management and
legal construction of labor and social security.”).
50. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 4 (“The employing units shall establish
and perfect rules and regulations in accordance with the law . . . .”).
51 . Id. art. 5 (requiring the state to take “various measures to promote
employment . . . lay down labour standards . . . and gradually raise the living standard
of labourers”).
52. Id. art. 85 (requiring the MLSS to “supervise and inspect the implementation
of laws, rules and regulations on labour by the employing unit, and have the power to
stop any acts that run counter to laws, rules and regulations on labour and order the
rectification thereof”).
53. Id. art. 89 (“Where the rules and regulations on labour formulated by the
employing unit run counter to the provisions of laws, rules and regulations, the
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violence or intimidation against employees can be criminally
sanctioned and subjected to a warning, a fine, or a fifteen-day
detention.54 Employers who force their employees to work in an
unsafe workplace environment may also be similarly
sanctioned.55
B. Changes to China’s Employment Law in 2008
After the passage of the 1994 Labor Law, widespread
changes in labor conditions were not immediately realized.56
With employers attempting to bypass the law through the
extensive use of dispatched workers (workers hired through an
intermediary employment agency), arrangements for which
individual employment contracts were not explicitly required,
many employer-employee relationships failed to culminate in a
contract. 57 In other cases, employers disregarded the law
altogether.58
administrative department of labour shall give a warning to the unit, and order it to
make corrections; where any harms have been caused to labourers, the unit shall be
liable for compensation.”).
54. Id. art. 96 (providing that if an employer uses intimidation or violence against
employees, the employer could be punished with a fifteen day detention, a fine, or a
warning).
55. Id. art. 93 (stating that employers who compel their workers to work in an
unsafe workplace environment “shall be investigated for criminal responsibility”).
56. See Sara Biddulph, Responding to the Industrial Unrest in China: Prospects for
Strengthening the Role of Collective Bargaining, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 35, 41 (2012)
(explaining how, despite the passage of the 1994 Labor Law, many workers still did not
have an employment contract); see also Dr. Louise Willans Floyd, When Old Meets New:
Some Perspectives on Recent Chinese Legal Developments and Their Relevance to the United
States (The Importance of Labor Law), 64 SMU L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2011) (discussing
briefly how the 2008 reforms were enacted in order to address the myriad problems still
faced by workers in China despite the 1994 Labor Law).
57. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 66 (“In keeping with global trends toward
more flexible and less stable employment relationships, employers in China also now
rely extensively on informal, part-time, temporary, or subcontracted workers,
arrangements which are not fully addressed under the 1994 Labor Law.”); see also
Beijing Tightens Loophole on Hiring Temporary Workers, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012, 6:59 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-china-labor-idUSBRE8BR041201
21228 (discussing how employers in China are more frequently using workers hired via
intermediary agencies in order to avoid complying with the new employment laws).
58. See Biddulph, supra note 56, at 40 (explaining how the 1994 Labor Law “failed
to provide adequate protection from abusive practices especially to the ever growing
number of workers leaving rural areas to find work in construction, small and mediumsized private enterprises, labour-intensive and export-oriented industries”); see also Li
Jing, China’s New Labor Contract Law and Protection of Workers, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
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China enacted new employment legislation in 2008 that
helped to address some of the shortcomings from the 1994
Labor Law.59 First, China passed the Labor Dispute Mediation
and Arbitration Law (“LMAL”) that provides workers and
employers with clearer guidelines about how to resolve labor
disputes. 60 Second, the Employment Promotion Law (“EPL”)
recognizes a worker’s right to work and to receive assistance
from the government when looking for a job.61 Third, the Labor
Contract Law (“LCL”) forms the core of the new legislation by
improving on the 1994 Labor Law.62
1. Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law
The LMAL was enacted to help resolve disputes between
employers and employees in a way that would protect the
interests and rights of both parties.63 The law is applicable to
disputes over wages, work hours, rest and vacation terms, the
safety of the workplace environment, expenses for job-related
injuries, and other work-related damages. 64 The LMAL
1083, 1110–12 (2009) (discussing how employers did not sign individual employment
contracts with workers so as to avoid the 1994 Labor Law’s substantive requirements).
59. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 38 (“In 2008, however, three new primary
labor laws took effect that together represent the first major retooling of China’s labor
legislation since its national Labor Law was enacted in 1994 . . . .”); see also Jing, supra
note 58, at 1106 (“The Labor Contract Law purports to draw upon China’s twenty-yearplus experience with labor contract practices and sets out to respond to some of the
manifest deficiencies of the Labor Law.”).
60. Dui Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (
) [Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) P.R.C. LAWS & REGS art. 1,
translated
at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471
614.htm (stating that this law was “enacted in order to resolve labor disputes in an
impartial and timely manner”).
61. Jiuye Cujin Fa (
) [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) P.R.C.
LAWS & REGS arts. 3, 52, translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200902/20/content_1471590.htm (recognizing a worker’s right to work and requiring the
state to assist workers in finding jobs).
62. Laodong Hetong Fa (
) [Labour Contract Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) P.R.C.
LAWS & REGS art. 1, translated at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/
content_1471106.htm (announcing that the law was enacted to improve on the
employment contract system).
63. Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, supra note 60, art. 1 (stating
that the LMAL was enacted to “protect the lawful rights and interests of the parties”).
64. Id. art. 2 (describing the disputes which the LMAL regulates).
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emphasizes that workers have rights when they are in a dispute
consultation with an employer, such as the right to ask a labor
union or third party to participate in the consultation.65 Further,
if a dispute involves ten or more workers requesting the same
form of relief, the workers can choose one worker to act as the
worker representative during any mediation, arbitration, or
litigation proceedings.66 The LMAL also gives workers the right
to file a complaint with the MLSS if an employer fails to pay
wages or other monetary damages for job-related injuries.67
The LMAL sets out specific guidelines on how employees
and employers should resolve an employment dispute. First,
workers may resolve the dispute by consulting with their
employer.68 If the consultation does not lead to a satisfactory
resolution, the parties may file an application with a mediation
committee. 69 In mediation, the worker is represented by a
worker representative who is either someone from the labor
union or a person designated by the workers to serve as the
worker representative. 70 The mediator must be either a
representative from the labor union or a person chosen by both
parties.71
If mediation fails to resolve the dispute within fifteen days
of when the mediation application was first filed, or if one of the
parties fails to comply with a mediation settlement’s terms,

65. Id. art. 4 (explaining that, should a dispute arise, workers may ask a union or
third-party to join in on a consultation with the employer).
66. Id. art. 7 (giving workers the right to choose a worker representative in
disputes involving ten or more workers).
67. Id. art. 9 (providing that, when an employer “defaults in the payment of labor
remuneration or . . . defaults in the payment of medical expenses for job-related injury,
economic compensation or damages, the worker concerned may make a complaint to
the administrative department of labor”).
68. Id. art. 4 (”When a labor dispute arises, the worker concerned may have a
consultation with the employing unit . . . .”).
69. Id. art. 5 (“Where a labor dispute arises and the parties are not willing to have
a consultation, or the consultation fails, or the settlement agreement reached is not
performed, they may apply to a mediation institution for mediation.”).
70. Id. art. 10 (requiring the worker representative in a mediation proceeding to
be a member of the union or someone designated by all the employees).
71 . Id. (“The director of the labor-dispute mediation commission of the
enterprise shall be a trade union member or a person chosen by both parties.”).
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either party may apply for arbitration.72 Arbitration differs from
mediation in that, in an arbitration proceeding, representatives
for the MLSS, the labor union, and the employers comprise the
arbitration commission. 73 The number of arbitrators on an
arbitration commission must be an odd number.74 The LMAL
does not explain how arbitrators are chosen, but does require
arbitrators to have some legal experience or experience with
working in a labor union or human resources management
position.75 Although the LMAL is silent as to which party should
pay for mediation or litigation, the government is required to
pay any fees incurred by either party during an arbitration
proceeding. 76 If a party is dissatisfied with an arbitration
decision, litigation may be used as a last resort.77 Workers can
initiate litigation challenging an arbitral award within fifteen
days from when the arbitral award was issued while employers
can only challenge an arbitral award under certain specified
circumstances.78
2. The Employment Promotion Law
The EPL emphasizes that workers have the right to work
and to choose a job.79 The EPL further provides workers with
rights and assistance when it comes to obtaining a job by
requiring the government to provide information and resources
to workers looking for employment.80 Local governments must
also provide workers with free consultations detailing

72. Id. art. 14 (providing that if the parties do not reach a mediation agreement
within fifteen days or the mediation agreement does not provide satisfactory results,
either party may apply for arbitration).
73. Id. art. 19 (stating that an arbitration proceeding shall be composed of
representatives for the MLSS, the labor union, and the employer).
74. Id. (requiring an odd number of arbitrators to serve on an arbitration
commission).
75. Id. art. 20 (listing out the requirements for arbitrators).
76. Id. art. 53 (“Arbitration of labor disputes is free of charge.”).
77. Id. art. 5 (providing that if either party is dissatisfied with an arbitral award, it
“may initiate a litigation”).
78. Id. arts. 48–49 (stating that a worker who is dissatisfied with an arbitral award
may challenge it in court, while employers may only challenge arbitral awards under
listed circumstances).
79. Employment Promotion Law, supra note 61, art. 3 (upholding a worker’s right
to work and the right to choose a job).
80. Id. art. 7 (requiring the state to assist workers in finding a job).
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employment policies and regulations.81 Labor unions, and other
public organizations, must also provide workers looking for jobs
with support and assistance.82
More importantly, the EPL has extensive provisions
requiring intermediaries to respect workers’ rights and
interests. 83 Intermediaries, or labor dispatch companies,
contract with individual employees and dispatch these
employees as needed to different worksites.84 Since workers sign
contracts directly with the intermediary, employers are not
required to sign individual employment contracts with these
dispatched workers and thus owe them no contractual
obligations.85
The EPL further regulates intermediaries by requiring
them to register with the administrative department for industry
and commerce.86 Intermediaries are also prohibited from lying
to employees or employers, working with employers operating
illegally, and withholding a worker’s identification materials or
other documents. 87 If an intermediary violates any of the
provisions laid out in the EPL, the intermediary may be

81. Id. art. 35 (obligating governments at the county level to provide information
about employment laws and regulations to workers).
82. Id. art. 9 (requiring labor unions and other public organizations, like women’s
groups or disabled person’s groups, to help protect and support workers’ right to
work).
83. Id. art. 39 (stating that intermediaries “are prohibited from infringing on the
legitimate rights and interests of the workers” who use their services).
), CHINA LAB.
84. See Labor Dispatch System in Reform: Window on the South (
NEWS TRANSLATION 1 (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/file_
download/139 (describing how intermediaries contract directly with the employee and
subsequently dispatch these employees to employers); see also Dexter Roberts, Why
China’s Factories Are Turning to Temp Workers, BUS. WK., Mar. 8, 2012,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-08/why-chinas-factories-are-turning-totemp-workers (“‘Labor dispatch’ companies recruit workers and send them as
temporary staff to factories in need.”).
85. See Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining how
employers have avoided compliance with employment laws through the use of
dispatched or temporary contract employees); see also Roberts, supra note 84 (reporting
that employers are more frequently using dispatched workers in order to avoid
complying with employment laws).
86. Employment Promotion Law, supra note 61, art. 40 (requiring intermediaries
to seek permission from and register with the administrative department of industry
and commerce).
87. Id. art. 41 (prohibiting intermediaries from providing false information,
working with employers operating illegally, or withholding a worker’s documents).
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subjected to a fine.88 If an intermediary charges a worker for
using its services, the MLSS must order the intermediary to
reimburse the worker and fine the intermediary at least
CNY¥500 (approximately US$81).89
3. The Labor Contract Law
The LCL, echoing the 1994 Labor Law, requires employers
and employees to sign individual employment contracts.90 This
law applies to fixed-term employment contracts, open-ended
employment contracts, and employment contracts that expire
upon the completion of a specified task. 91 Unlike the 1994
Labor Law, the LCL defines fixed-term and open-ended
contracts and gives workers the right to negotiate with their
employers over the length of these terms. 92 An employment
contract is required to contain terms pertaining to work hours,
rest breaks, vacation hours, wages, and occupational health and
safety standards.93 If an employer and employee fail to conclude
a written employment contract within one year of when the
worker was first hired, an open-ended contract is automatically
created.94
The LCL establishes default terms for employment
contracts should an employer fail to create one with an
individual employee. For instance, if an employee has started
working without an individual employment contract, the
employee’s wage is based on the rate specified in the collective
88. Id. arts. 65–66 (stating that intermediaries may be fined for providing false
information, withholding a worker’s documents, or operating without permission).
89. Id. art. 66 (requiring the MLSS to fine an intermediary CNY¥500 but not more
than CNY¥2,000 if the intermediary forces a worker to pay a deposit for using its
services).
90 . Labour Contract Law, supra note 62, art. 10 (“To establish a labor
relationship, a written labor contract shall be concluded.”).
91. Id. art. 12 (“Labor contracts consist of fixed-term labor contracts, open-ended
labor contracts and labor contracts that expire upon completion of given jobs.”).
92. Id. arts. 13–14 (defining fixed-term contracts as contracts with specified end
dates agreed upon by the employees and employers, and defining open-ended
employment contracts as contracts where the employees and employers agree to not fix
an end date).
93. Id. art. 17 (listing the terms required in employment contracts).
94. Id. art. 14 (providing that an employment contract is automatically created if
an employer “fails to conclude a written [employment] contract with a worker within
one year”).

2014]

INVESTING IN HUMAN RIGHTS

1233

contract or, if the collective contract does not address wages,
local minimum wage standards.95 Further, if a dispute arises over
hours or workplace safety issues and the employer and employee
cannot reach an agreement, the provisions in the collective
contract shall apply and, if there is no collective contract, local
laws on hours and working conditions apply.96
The LCL also provides workers with the right to revoke the
employment contract in whole or in part if the contract was
created through misrepresentation or coercion or contains
provisions waiving an employer’s obligations under relevant
employment laws and regulations. 97 Even if an employment
contract or a provision of the contract is revoked, an employer
must still pay the worker for any work performed by using the
average wage paid to similarly situated employees.98 A worker is
also given the right to revoke their contract if an employer fails
to provide safe working conditions, pay wages on time and in
full, or otherwise impairs a worker’s interest or rights in any
way.99 If an employer uses violence or intimidation to compel a
worker to work, the worker has the right to revoke the
employment contract without notifying the employer in
advance. 100 Lastly, the LCL gives workers the right to
immediately petition the court for relief if the employer fails to
pay wages on time rather than going through an extensive
mediation and arbitration process first.101
95. Id. art. 11 (stating that the collective contract or local minimum wage
standards shall be used as default terms if an employee is working without an individual
employment contract).
96. Id. art. 18 (discussing how, if an employer and employees fail to reach a
resolution during a dispute about hours or working conditions, relevant collective
contract provisions or local laws will apply as default terms).
97. Id. art. 26 (invalidating an employment contract or parts of an employment
contract obtained through misrepresentation or coercion or if it contains provisions
waiving an employer’s obligations to comply with employment laws).
98. Id. art. 28 (requiring the employer to pay workers for any work performed
under an employment contract, even if the employment contract is later invalidated).
99. Id. art. 38 (providing employees with the right to revoke an employment
contract if the employer fails to provide safe working conditions, pay wages on time and
in full, or abide by relevant employment laws and regulations).
100. Id. (“If an employing unit forces a person to work by resorting to violence,
intimidation or illegal restriction of personal freedom . . . , [the worker] may revoke
the labor contract forthwith without notifying the employing unit of the matter in
advance.”).
101. Id. art. 30 (stating that, if an employer defaults in paying wages, the worker
may petition a court to order the employer to pay).
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The LCL further restricts employers by prohibiting them
from immediately terminating an employee who cannot work
due to a work-related injury or who is on medical leave. 102
Employers also cannot immediately fire a worker who has
worked for the employer continuously for fifteen years and is
five years away from reaching retirement age.103 In other words,
Article 42 of the LCL protects groups of employees, like the
injured and the elderly, from being immediately fired by an
employer unless there is some exceeding justification for the
termination. In any other circumstance, an employer may fire
the employee after providing notice thirty days in advance or
paying the employee an extra month’s salary.104 Employers must
inform their employees about any workplace rules, regulations,
and decisions that have a direct bearing on the workers’
immediate interests.105 Employers must provide employees with
accurate information about the job’s occupational hazards and
safety issues and remuneration guidelines, as well as any other
information the worker requests.106 Under the LCL, employers
cannot violate labor quotas or compel workers to work
overtime. 107 The LCL also provides more protections for
dispatched workers by requiring intermediaries to sign at least a
two-year, fixed-term contract with each dispatched worker, to
pay wages on a monthly basis, and to specify the length of time a
dispatched worker can work at a specific worksite. 108
102. Id. art. 42(1)–(2) (prohibiting employers from terminating an employment
contract with an employee who cannot work due to a work-related injury or an illness).
103. Id. art. 42(5) (stating that employers may not immediately fire a worker who
had worked with the employer for fifteen years and is five years away from retirement
age).
104. Id. arts. 40, 42 (listing the circumstances under which an employer must
either provide notice to a worker before terminating an employment contract or pay an
extra month’s salary).
105. Id. art. 4 (“The employing unit shall make public or inform the workers of
the rules and regulations, and the decisions on important matters, which have a direct
bearing on the immediate interests of the workers.”).
106. Id. art. 8 (“When an employing unit recruits a worker, it shall truthfully
inform him of the job description, the working conditions, the place of work,
occupational hazards, conditions for work safety, labor remuneration and other
matters which the worker requests to be informed of.”).
107. Id. art. 31 (barring employers from violating labor quotas or compelling
employees to work overtime).
108. Id. arts. 58–59 (requiring intermediaries to sign two-year, fixed-term contracts
with each worker, pay workers on a monthly basis, and to specify how long each worker
will stay at a worksite).
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Intermediaries are prohibited from charging workers a fee for
using their services and from pocketing any of the workers’
wages.109
Employers must consult with the union or a chosen
workers’ representative before making any decision that might
affect the immediate interests of workers, such as decisions
relating to remuneration, work hours, rest and vacation times,
occupational safety and health standards, worker’s insurance
and welfare, training, disciplinary proceedings, and labor
quotas.110 For example, if an employer needs to cut employment
by more than twenty persons or more than ten percent of the
total number of employees, the employer may do so only after
consulting with the union or all of the employees thirty days
prior.111 An employer, however, is allowed to significantly cut
down their workforce only if it is absolutely necessary, such as if
the company is facing dire production and management issues
or cannot afford to keep the same amount of workers.112
The LCL reiterates that workers have the right to negotiate
for a collective contract with their employers.113 A labor union
or, if a labor union has not yet been established, a worker
representative elected by the workers, must sign off on the
collective contract.114 In contrast to the 1994 Labor Law, the
LCL further provides that the MLSS must approve a collective
contract before it becomes effectuated.115
The LCL gives labor unions a more active role in
representing workers’ rights by permitting unions to
immediately initiate arbitration or litigation proceedings against
109. Id. art. 60 (prohibiting intermediaries from charging workers a fee or from
pocketing a worker’s wages).
110. Id. art. 4 (requiring employers to consult with either the labor union or a
workers’ representative before making any decision that might affect workers’ interests
and rights).
111. Id. art. 41 (stating that if an employer fires a certain number or percentage of
their workforce, the employer must do so after notifying the labor union or all the
employees at least thirty days in advance).
112. Id. (allowing employers to lay off a significant portion of their workforce only
if the company is facing major production, management, or financial issues).
113. Id. art. 51 (giving workers the right to negotiate for a collective contract).
114. Id. (stating that a collective contract must be approved by either a labor
union or by a worker representative elected by the workers).
115. Id. art. 54 (requiring the MLSS to approve a collective contract before it
becomes valid).
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an employer in disputes over collective contract provisions.116 If
a worker individually brings an arbitration or litigation
proceeding against an employer, labor unions must provide the
worker with support and assistance.117 Labor unions must also
provide assistance and guidance to workers who are in
negotiations with an employer to create an individual
employment contract.118 The LCL also requires labor unions to
supervise employers to ensure that they are abiding by the terms
of an individual employment contract or the collective
contract.119
The LCL sets out more specific penalties for employers and
intermediaries who violate the law. If an employer fails to
conclude an individual employment contract with a worker, the
employer must pay the worker two times his salary for each
month the worker has worked without an employment contract
for up to a year, at which point an open-ended contract is
automatically created.120 In cases where an employer withholds
wages from an employee or fails to pay adequate overtime wages,
the MLSS must order the employer to pay these wages, and if
the employer continues to withhold wages the MLSS can order
the employer to pay additional compensation. 121 If an
intermediary withholds a worker’s identification cards or other
documents, the MLSS must order the intermediary to return
these documents. 122 If an intermediary commits a particular
serious violation of the LCL, the MLSS must fine the

116. Id. art. 56 (giving labor unions the power to directly initiate arbitration or
litigation proceedings against an employer in a dispute over the provisions of a
collective contract).
117. Id. art. 78 (“Where a worker applies for arbitration or brings a lawsuit, the
trade union concerned shall provide him with support and assistance . . . .”).
118. Id. art. 6 (“The trade union shall give assistance and guidance to the workers
in lawfully concluding labor contracts with the employing unit . . . .”).
119. Id. art. 78 (requiring labor unions to “supervise the performance of labor
contracts and collective contracts by the employing units” in order to protect the rights
and interests of workers).
120. Id. art. 82 (ordering employers to pay a worker twice their salary per month
and automatically creating an open-ended contract after a year).
121. Id. art. 85 (requiring the MLSS to order employers to pay employees any
back-wages and additional compensation if the employer continues to withhold wages).
122. Id. art. 84 (requiring the MLSS to order intermediaries to return any
documents provided to the intermediary by an employee).
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intermediary at least CNY¥1000 (approximately US$162) but
not more than CNY¥5000 (approximately US$80).123
C. China’s Laws Governing Labor Unions: The Trade Union Law
The 1992 Trade Union Law (“1992 TUL”) first codified
China’s unions’ right to initiate collective contract negotiations
with employers.124 The 1992 TUL was amended in 2001 (“2001
TUL”), and these amendments strengthened workers’ rights to
join and participate in a labor union.125 The 2001 TUL generally
provides that a labor union must protect the interests and rights
of workers while simultaneously protecting China’s overall state
interests.126 Under the 2001 TUL, labor unions must listen to
workers’ complaints, voice workers’ demands and opinions, and
“help them solve their difficulties and serve them
wholeheartedly.” 127 Like the LCL, the 2001 TUL gives labor
unions the right to initiate consultation, arbitration, and then
litigation proceedings directly against the employer if the
employer violates a worker’s rights or interests.128 The 2001 TUL
provides further protections for workers who join a union by
granting the MLSS the power to order the employer to reinstate
the employee and pay any back wages in the event of a labor or

123. Id. art. 92 (requiring the MLSS to fine an intermediary at least CNY¥1000 for
particularly serious violations but not more than CNY¥5000).
124. See Ronald C. Brown, China’s Collective Contract Provisions: Can Collective
Negotiations Embody Collective Bargaining?, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35, 37 (2006)
(“The 1992 Trade Union Law in fact first authorized unions at the enterprise level to
conclude collective contracts with the employer.”); see also 1992 Gonghui Fa (
)
[1992 Trade Union Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 3, 1992, effective Apr. 3, 1992) P.R.C. LAWS & REGS art. 6, translated at http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053571.html
(codifying labor unions’ obligation to represent the interests and rights of workers).
125. 2001 Gonghui Fa (
) [2001 Trade Union Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001) P.R.C.
LAWS & REGS art. 3, translated at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_
75948.htm (reaffirming workers’ rights to join labor unions).
126. 2001 Trade Union Law, supra note 125, art. 6 (stating that labor unions must
“safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of workers . . . . [w]hile protecting the
overall interests of the entire Chinese people”).
127. Id. (requiring unions to listen to workers’ complaints, voice their demands,
and overall assist workers with any difficulties).
128. Id. art. 20 (providing that labor unions may initiate arbitration or litigation
proceedings against an employer if an employer violates a worker’s rights or interests).
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employment law violation.129 The 2001 TUL prohibits employers
from insulting, slandering, injuring, or taking retaliatory action
against a union’s staff members. 130 The 2001 TUL, overall,
improved on the 1992 TUL by strengthening a labor union’s
obligation to protect workers’ rights and interests.131
D. China’s Provisions on Collective Contracts
The MLSS promulgated the Provisions on Collective
Contract (“Provisions”) in 2004. 132 The purpose of the
Provisions is to strengthen the rights of workers during
negotiations for collective contracts.133 The Provisions cover all
commercial institutions in China, both public and private.134
Under the Provisions, the labor union chooses a worker
representative or, if a labor union has not yet been established,
the employees may vote for a person to act as the workers’
representative during collective negotiations. 135 The worker
representative must represent the workers’ interests.136 Before
the collective contract becomes valid, first it must be submitted
to and approved by the employees.137 Collective contracts are
129. Id. art. 52 (explaining that an employer is required to rehire an employee
and pay any back wages if the employee was fired for participating in a union).
130. Id. art. 51 (stating that employers who humiliate, slander, or injure a staff
member of a labor union may be subjected to a criminal investigation).
131. See Brown, supra note 124, at 37 (“The Trade Union Law as amended in 2001
continued to strengthen the union’s mandate in collective wage negotiations.”); see also
CLB Analysis of the New Trade Union Law, CHINA LABOUR BULL. (Feb. 28, 2002),
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/clb-analysis-new-trade-union-law
(hesitantly
agreeing that the 2001 Trade Union Law comes closer to ILO standards but leaves
much to be desired).
132. Guanyu Jiti Hetong De Guiding (
) [Provisions on
Collective Contract] (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, May 1,
2004, effective May 1, 2004), translated at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
pocc373.
133. Provisions on Collective Contract, supra note 132, art. 1 (providing that the
purpose of the Provisions is to further protect both workers’ and employers’ interests
when they are engaged in negotiations to create a collective contract).
134. Id. art. 2 (stating that the Provisions apply to both commercial enterprises
and public institutions).
135. Id. art. 20 (laying out the procedures in choosing a worker representative
both in scenarios in which there is a union and when there is not).
136. Id. art. 19 (requiring a worker’s representative to “take part in the collective
negotiation on behalf of the interests of their own party”).
137. Id. art. 36 (providing that a collective contract may not be adopted unless the
contract is discussed at a meeting where at least two thirds of all the employees or
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not permanent and the parties to the negotiation may stipulate
to keep the collective contract for at least one year but no more
than three years.138 Further, collective contracts may be modified
or cancelled if either party cannot perform its contractual
duties.139 The employer must have a justifiable reason to refuse
participating in collective negotiations.140
E. International Labor Standards and Rights
China joined the ILO in 1919.141 The ILO’s purpose is to
promote cooperation between employers, workers, and
governments in order to further protect and reinforce the rights
of workers.142 The ILO promulgates conventions that set out
basic principles on workers’ rights.143 These conventions, once
ratified by a member state, are legally binding instruments in
that state. 144 The ILO has identified eight conventions as
fundamental because they cover “subjects that are considered as
fundamental principles and rights at work.”145 China has ratified
twenty-five of the ILO’s conventions, twenty-two of which are still
in force. 146 China has ratified half of the fundamental
conventions, and specifically has not ratified (1) Convention No.
87, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
employee representatives are present and half of the employees or the employee
representatives approve the contract).
138. Id. art. 38 (“In general, the period of validity of a collective contract or a
special collective contract shall be 1 to 3 years . . . .”).
139. Id. art. 40 (listing the circumstances under which a collective contract may be
modified or cancelled).
140. Id. art. 56 (stating that an employer cannot refuse to engage in collective
negotiations without a justifiable reason).
141 . China, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:
11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
142. How the ILO Works, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-theilo-works/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
143 . Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-andrecommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (describing the
purpose of the ILO conventions).
144. Id. (stating that once a member state ratifies a convention, it becomes a
legally binding international treaty).
145. Id. (listing the conventions considered as fundamental by the ILO).
146. Ratifications for China, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:
11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). The
three conventions not in force are either outdated conventions or shelved conventions,
meaning that they are no longer regularly updated by the ILO.
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Organize Convention, (2) Convention No. 98, the Right to
Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, (3)
Convention No. 29, the Forced Labour Convention, and (4)
Convention No. 105, the Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention.147 Generally, these conventions protect a worker’s
right to form a union and engage in collective bargaining, and
prohibit the use of forced or compulsory labor.148 Even if a
member has not yet ratified a specific fundamental convention,
all members of the ILO have an obligation to promote and
realize these conventions’ espoused principles.149
This Part first discusses the ILO Declaration on Social
Justice, which is a restatement of the ILO’s main principles
within the context of a more globalized economy. It next
discusses the declaration the ILO adopted addressing the
interactions of MNCs, state governments, and the rights of
workers.
1. The ILO Declaration on Social Justice
In 2008, the Ninety-Seventh International Labour
Conference adopted the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a
Fair Globalization (the “ILO Declaration on Social Justice”), the
third major statement of principles and policies adopted by the
organization since its first Constitution in 1919. 150 The ILO
Declaration on Social Justice specifically addresses the problems
147. Id.
148 . International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 87) Concerning
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, July 9, 1948, 68
U.N.T.S. 17.; International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargaining Collectively, July
1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257; International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55;
International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
149 . See International Labour Organisation, Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-up art. 2, June 18, 1998 (Annex revised
June 15, 2010) (“[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation . . . to promote and to realize, in good faith and in
accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions . . . .”).
150. International Labour Organisation, Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair
Globalization preface, Aug. 13, 2008 (“This is the third major statement of principles
and policies adopted by the International Labour Conference since the ILO’s
Constitution of 1919.”).
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that globalization poses to workers’ rights.151 Specifically, the
ILO Declaration on Social Justice recognizes how globalized
economic integration fosters economic growth and increases
employment rates, but at the same time nonetheless causes
some countries to face major challenges relating to income
inequality, poverty levels, and job security.152
The ILO Declaration on Social Justice lays out four strategic
objectives that require member states to develop and enhance
labor protections within their borders to help realize
fundamental workers’ rights more universally. 153 The ILO
Declaration on Social Justice further provides that the ILO
should provide assistance to member states wishing to
incorporate the principles of the four objectives into a bilateral
or multilateral agreement. 154 The ILO Declaration on Social
Justice encourages both the ILO and member states to
cooperate with both MNCs and labor unions in order to further
promote these four objectives.155
2. The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.
The ILO Declaration on Social Justice also reaffirms the
policies stated in the Tripartite Declaration of Principles
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (the
“Tripartite Declaration”). 156 The principles in the Tripartite
Declaration are intended to guide governments, employers,
workers, and MNCs on how to act in accordance with the

151. Id. (stating that the ILO Declaration on Social Justice was adopted to
reaffirm ILO values within “the context of globalization.”).
152. Id. at 5 (discussing how globalization has boosted some countries’ economies
while simultaneously causing detrimental effects in other countries’ employment
sectors).
153. Id. art. I(A) (outlining the goals and purposes of the ILO Declaration on
Social Justice’s strategic objectives).
154. Id. art. II(A)(iv) (permitting member states to ask the ILO for assistance in
creating a bilateral or multilateral agreement that fosters the achievement of the four
objectives).
155. Id. art. II(A)(v) (encouraging cooperation between states, MNCs, and labor
unions to further realize the four strategic objectives).
156. Id. 8 (listing the Tripartite Declaration and its objectives as having “particular
relevance”).
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principles espoused by the ILO.157 It recognizes that MNCs and
their affiliated organizations could contribute to abusive
workplace practices, either directly or indirectly.158 Thus, the
Tripartite Declaration encourages MNCs to play a stronger role
when it comes to ensuring that workers’ rights are respected,
promoting economic and social welfare, and improving the
living standards in other countries.159
The Tripartite Declaration states that MNCs should respect
the sovereign rights of each state, abide by national laws and
regulations, give adequate consideration to local practices, and
heed applicable international standards. 160 Specifically, the
Tripartite Declaration encourages governments that have not
yet ratified Convention Nos. 87 and 98 to do so.161 MNCs are
encouraged to consult with relevant authorities and workers’
organizations in order to ensure that their operations do not
violate that country’s social development policies.162 MNCs are
expected to take steps to ameliorate their impact on the labor
markets of other nations by providing stable employment and
notifying the appropriate government authorities or workers’
representatives of any changes that would have major effects on
employment rates.163 MNCs should not offer wages, benefits, or
conditions that are less favorable than those offered by

157. See International Labour Organisation, Tripartite Declaration of Principles
concerning
Multinational
Enterprises
and
Social
Policy,
para.
5,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/--multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf..
158. Id. para. 1 (discussing how MNCs, through international direct investment,
can either benefit a state or lead to unfair “concentrations of economic power” that
could conflicts with the interests of workers).
159. Id. (explaining that MNCs “can also make an important contribution to the
promotion of economic and social welfare; to the improvement of living standards and
the satisfaction of basic needs; to the creation of employment opportunities, both
directly and indirectly; and to the enjoyment of basic human rights, including freedom
of association, throughout the world”).
160. Id. para. 8 (stating that MNCs should respect a state’s sovereignty, a state’s
laws, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international frameworks
promulgated by the ILO).
161. Id. para. 9 (encouraging nations to ratify Convention Nos. 87 and 98).
162. Id. para. 17 (stating that MNCs should try to ensure that their plans do not
affect a nation’s social development policies).
163 . Id. paras. 25–26 (stating that MNCs should try to maintain steady
employment rates and notify relevant authorities if their actions affect employment
rates).
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comparable employers.164 If the MNC is operating in a country
with no comparable employer, the MNC should provide wages,
benefits, and conditions in accordance with relevant laws.165
The Tripartite Declaration also states that workers in MNCs
have the right to establish and join unions.166 The state must
protect these unions against interferences from employers or
other third parties.167 Further, governments are prohibited from
offering special incentives to attract more FDI that would limit
the workers’ freedom of association, right to organize, or right
to collectively bargain.168
F. Investments in the International Sphere.
The international investment sphere has grown
exponentially in the past few decades.169 Despite this boom in
international investments, there is currently no existing global
investment regulatory scheme. 170 Although some states and
organizations attempted to initiate negotiations to form a
multilateral agreement on investment (“MAI”), activists
vehemently opposed this attempt, arguing that this type of
164 . Id. para. 33 (“Wages, benefits and conditions of work offered by
multinational enterprises should be not less favourable to the workers than those
offered by comparable employers in the country concerned.”).
165 . Id. para. 34 (“When multinational enterprises operate in developing
countries, where comparable employers may not exist, they should provide the best
possible wages, benefits and conditions of work, within the framework of government
policies.”).
166. Id. para. 42 (stating that workers employed by MNCs have the right to
establish and join unions).
167. Id. para. 43 (requiring states to adequately protect unions against possible
interferences by employers or other parties).
168. Id. para. 46 (prohibiting governments from lowering workers’ rights or
standards in order to attract more investment).
169. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (“The frenetic rate of globalization has
increased the number of MNCs, and consequently, the frequency of FDI and the use of
BITs.”); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 36 (“In the past decade, there has been an
explosion of BITs, and other forms of [international investment agreements] . . . .”).
170. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (“While two [World Trade Organization]
agreements touch on trade-related investment they do not constitute comprehensive
multilateral investment regulations . . . .”); see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION &
DEV., Multilateral Agreement on Investment, http://www.oecd.org/investment/
internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.htm
[hereinafter OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment] (describing how, although
negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment were initiated, these
negotiations ceased in April 1998).
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instrument was essentially a “corporate bill of rights.”171 MAI
negotiations ended fifteen years ago and have not yet
resumed.172
Despite the failure to create an MAI, investment between
nations continues to grow, leading to an equally exponential
boom in the formation of BITs.173 Generally, there are five major
actors in a BIT.174 First, there is a host state, the state in which an
MNC invests.175 Second, the home state is the state the MNCinvestor is incorporated.176 The third actors are the investors,
which are usually MNCs but may be individuals.177 Fourth, there
are the people or groups affected by the investment.178 Lastly,
the fifth actor is the arbitration tribunal that helps resolve claims
arising from a provision of a BIT.179
171. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 486 (“Activists argued against the agreement,
concerned that it would constitute a corporate bill of rights . . . .”); see also Multilateral
Agreement On Investment, GLOBAL POL’Y F., http://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/
globalization-of-the-economy-2-1/multilateral-agreement-on-investment-2-5.html
(reporting that negotiations for the MAI fell through due to fears that it would
threaten state sovereignty and would lead to a “race to the bottom” situation).
172 . See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, supra note 170 (stating that negotiations for an MAI ended in April 1998
and will not resume); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 486 (explaining that
negotiations for an MAI ended in April 1998 and have showed no signs of resuming).
173. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 485 (describing how the growth of MNCs and
FDI has led to the creation of more BITs); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 36
(describing how the number of BITs has increased exponentially in the past decade).
174. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (describing the actors involved in or
affected by BITs); see also JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS 182–84 (2013) (stating that BITs
generally involve investors and two states but can also have effects on local communities
or peoples).
175. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“First, a ‘Host-State’ is the State-Party in
which an investment exists.”); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do
BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,
46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 89 (2005) (using the term host country to describe the state in
which an MNC invests).
176. Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“[A] ‘Home-State’ is the State of corporate
citizenship of the investing MNC.”).
177. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (stating that investors are the third actors
involved in BIT proceedings); see also Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 175, at 75 (noting
that an “impetus behind the rapid expansion of BITs rests in the desire of companies
of industrialized states to invest safely and securely in developing countries”).
178. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“Fourth, impacted non-State actors are
those people [or] groups that are affected by the actions or demands of the investing
MNCs.”); see also RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 184 (describing how BITs can sometimes
affect local communities).
179. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 487 (“Fifth, ‘arbitration tribunals’ serve as the
dispute resolution mechanisms for disputes arising under a BIT.”); see also RUGGIE,
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Under a BIT, the investor can directly bring a claim against
the state in a private arbitration tribunal.180 Arbitration awards
are binding on the parties and usually limited to money
damages. 181 A leading international arbitration institution
devoted to disputes arising between investors and a state is the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”). 182 Under ICSID rules, a party initiates arbitration
proceedings by submitting a request and memorials, documents
containing a summary of the facts and laws applicable to the
case, to the arbitration tribunal.183 After these documents are
submitted, a hearing is held where either party may present
witness or expert testimony and other types of evidence to the
arbitration tribunal.184 Although disputes between investors and
states are increasing, the exact number of arbitration cases
resolved is unknown because the resolutions are usually kept
private.185

supra note 174, at 184 (describing how arbitration tribunals are involved in the BIT
process).
180. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 489 (stating that an “investor may bypass
domestic court systems and bring a claim directly against the Host-State before an
international arbitration tribunal”); see also RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 183
(“[T]ypically a BIT permits the investor to initiate compulsory international arbitration
claims against the state.”).
181. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 490 (explaining how arbitration decisions are
binding on the parties and usually limited to financial compensation); see also Stephan
W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the
People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 87–88 (2007) (explaining
that an arbitration award is binding and enforceable).
182. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 489 (“The leading international arbitration
institution devoted to investor-State dispute settlement is the [ICSID].”); see also Schill,
supra note 181, at 87–88 (“In standard international practice, investor-State arbitration
is most often conducted under the rules of the [ICSID].”).
183. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Convention,
Regulations and Rules, rs. 30–31, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF-chap04.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (outlining the written
procedures under ICSID rules and the process of transmitting a request).
184. Id. rs. 32–33 (describing ICSID’s rules for the oral procedure aspect of an
arbitration proceeding as well as for marshalling evidence).
185. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 491 (“The exact number of investor-State
arbitration cases [is] unknown because the initiation of the arbitration and their results
are not always released publicly.”); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 63–64 (stating how,
although there has been a move towards greater transparency in investment
arbitration, “greater acceptance of non-disputing party rights in international
investment arbitration is not yet universal”).
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Most states have a model BIT that serves as a template when
states enter BIT negotiations.186 One provision found in most
BITs is the “national treatment” provision that promises equal
treatment for both in-state and out-of-state investors.187 Other
provisions that model BITs commonly include are most-favored
nation provisions, guaranteeing out-of-state investors from one
state the same rights granted to investors from another state,
and fair and equitable treatment provisions, which guarantee
out-of-state investors minimum standards of treatment.188 Some
BITs may contain risk-stabilization provisions that freeze
regulatory regimes for the duration of a specific investment.189
BITs may also contain “non-lowering of standards” provisions
that prohibit states from derogating from labor standards in
order to attract more investment from MNC-investors. 190 For
instance, the US Model BIT has two non-lowering of standards
provisions, with one addressing environmental standards and
the other relating to labor standards.191 Specifically, Article 13 of

186. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (“Most countries have a Model BIT which
serves as a template and is typically used as a starting point to conduct negotiations of
new BITs.”); see also Footer, supra note 20, at 36 (listing Canada, Norway, and the
United States, among others, as states that have model BITs).
187 . See Schill, supra note 181, at 93 (explaining that national treatment
provisions are common in most BITs and require the host state to not discriminate
against out-of-state investors); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (describing how
BITs commonly contain national treatment provisions protecting investors against
discriminatory treatment).
188. See RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 182 (listing the rights that BITs commonly
provide to investors); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (describing how BITs
commonly contain national treatment provisions, most-favored nation provisions, and
fair and equitable treatment provisions).
189. See Sheffer, supra note 19, at 497 (explaining that risk-stabilization clauses
can sometimes insulate investors from the need to obey certain new laws or
regulations); see also RUGGIE, supra note 174, at 182 (discussing how some BITs contain
provisions protecting out-of-state investors against new laws or regulations passed by the
state).
190. See Footer, supra note 20, at 43 (explaining that non-lowering of standards
clauses help to “suppress the temptation of host states to lower their environmental or
labour standards as an incentive to attract foreign investment”); see also RUGGIE, supra
note 174, at 184–85 (discussing how non-lowering of standards provisions work).
191. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, arts.
MODEL
BIT],
available
at
12–13
(2012)
[hereinafter
US
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (prohibiting signatory
states from lowering labor and environmental standards in order to draw in more FDI).
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the US Model BIT prohibits signatory-states from lowering their
labor standards in order to draw in more investments.192
To summarize, the 1994 Labor Law and the changes to
employment and labor laws during the 2000s form the basic
framework governing the employer-employee relationship in
China. Further, the Provisions supplement China’s labor laws by
providing additional detail about collective negotiations and
collective contracts. As a member of the ILO, labor standards in
China must comply with the principles expressed in the ILO
Declaration on Social Justice and the Tripartite Declaration.
Lastly, the growth of the international investment sphere has led
to the growth of BITs, instruments geared towards protecting
the rights of investors investing in another state.
II. HOW LABOR VIOLATIONS IN CHINA AND BITS’ INVESTORORIENTED APPROACH AFFECT WORKERS’ RIGHTS
Despite the changes in China’s labor and employment laws
during the 2000s, factories in China continue to use abusive
labor practices that violate both state law and ILO labor
standards. 193 These labor practices are more prevalent and
pervasive in factories that manufacture products for or are in
contract with MNCs. 194 Part II.A first addresses how Chinese
factories and companies continue to violate labor and
employment laws. Part II.B discusses how, despite China’s labor
laws, labor unions in China still fail to adequately protect
workers’ rights and interests. Lastly, Part II.C discusses how the
192. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 13 (outlining the US Model BIT’s
provisions on labor standards).
193. See, e.g., Barboza, supra note 29 (“Nearly a decade after some of the most
powerful companies in the world . . . began an effort to eliminate sweatshop labor
conditions in Asia, worker abuse is still commonplace in many of the Chinese factories
that supply Western companies . . . .”); see also Fresh Labor Violations in Chinese Factory
Producing the “Cheap” iPhone, CHINA LAB. WATCH, Sept. 5, 2013, http://
www.chinalaborwatch.org/news/new-463.html (describing how factories in China
continue to violate workers’ rights by failing to pay overtime wages, violating laws
limiting overtime hours, and subjecting their workers to intense work conditions).
194. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 1 (arguing that abusive
labor practices are “firmly entrenched in the global supply-chain system”); see also
Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse of Chinese Workers: An Investigation of Six Mattel Supplier Factories,
CHINA LAB. WATCH 1 (2013), http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/2013.10.15-Mattelreport.pdf [hereinafter Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse] (revealing how factories in China that
produce products for MNCs reduce costs by lowering labor standards).
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current BIT regime primarily protects the interests of MNCinvestors and not the interests of the state.
A. Violations of Labor Standards or Laws Concerning Overtime,
Adequate Wages, Child Labor, and Safe Working Conditions
This Part addresses the labor abuses still practiced by
factories in China. Part II.A.1 discusses how factories in China
still violate legal limits on overtime. Part II.A.2 describes the
inadequacy of wages paid to workers in China. Part II.A.3
provides an overview of the dangerous, and sometimes deadly,
factory work environments. Part II.A.4 describes the use of child
labor by factories in contract with MNCs. Lastly, Part II.A.5
discusses how employers use intermediaries in order to avoid
complying with China’s labor and employment laws.
1. Overtime Limit Violations
China’s employment laws provide that workers shall not
work for more than eight hours a day and no more than fortyfour hours per week. 195 Although these laws permit some
companies to extend hours, they may do so only after seeking
and receiving approval from the MLSS. 196 In regards to
overtime, employees must not work more than thirty-six
overtime hours per month.197
Some organizations that investigated China’s factories
discovered that actual overtime hours worked per month were
not in compliance with the legally imposed limits.198 In some
cases, the overtime hours exceeded the legal limit by over
200%.199 China Labor Watch (“CLW”), an independent nongovernmental organization based in New York, investigated ten
195. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 36 (explaining China’s laws on work
hours and overtime hours).
196. Id. art. 39 (describing how employers may exempt themselves from work
hour limits with the approval of the MLSS).
197. Id. art. 41 (stating that workers may not work more than thirty-six overtime
hours per month).
198. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (reporting that some
workers’ overtime hours went as high as 160 hours per month); see also Fresh Labor
Violations in Chinese Factory Producing the “Cheap” iPhone, supra note 193 (reporting that
at one factory, “110 hours of overtime per month is common”).
199. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (indicating that some
workers worked a total of 160 overtime hours per month).
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“global brand supplier electronics factories” from October 2010
to June 2011.200 This report found that electronics factories had
“notable sweatshop characteristics” including excessive overtime
hours and maintaining extremely high levels of work intensity.201
Further, some of these factories, in an effort to draw in more
business from MNCs, compelled their employees periodically to
work these excessive overtime hours.202
2. Inadequate or Withheld Wage Payments
China’s employment law specifies that a factory’s minimum
wage must not be lower than the local minimum wage combined
with the living expenses of the worker and those family members
the worker supports.203 Employers may not withhold or embezzle
wages without justification. 204 Employment law also requires
workers to be paid 150% of their normal wage when working
overtime hours.205
The minimum wage for employees working in electronics
factories frequently does not meet local minimum wage
standards. 206 In some cases, workers have to take on extra
overtime hours in order to break even.207 In other cases, workers

200. Id. at 1 (detailing the logistics of their investigation).
201 . Id. at 11 (describing how “[s]ome of the more notable sweatshop
characteristics in Chinese electronics factories” include excessive overtime hours,
extremely intensive workplace practices, and verbally attacking workers).
202. Id. at 11–12 (discussing how supply-chain factories force workers to work
“‘voluntary’ overtime” in order to increase profits); see also Swimming against the Tide,
CHINA LABOUR BULL. 16 (2010), http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/File/research_
reports/Labour%20Conflict%20Report%20final.pdf (finding that factories contracting
with MNCs force their employees to work overtime in order to meet target quotas).
203. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, arts. 48–49 (stating that a worker’s wages
should not be lower than local standards of minimum wages and should consider the
living expenses of the worker and his family).
204. Id. art. 50 (“The wages to be paid to labourers shall not be embezzled nor the
payment thereof delayed without justification.”).
205. Id. art. 44 (stating that employers shall pay “no less than 150 per cent of the
normal wages if an extension of working hours is arranged”).
206. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (reporting that the
minimum wage in some of these factories does not meet a worker’s living costs); see also
Swimming against the Tide, supra note 202, at 17 (discussing how some companies paid
less than the legal minimum wage).
207. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 5 (“Workers cannot earn
a living wage from normal working hours alone, and must work excessive overtime
hours in order to earn enough money to survive.”); see also Swimming against the Tide,
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did not earn enough because they were still owed either back
pay or were not adequately compensated for working overtime
hours.208 Further, some factories used wages as a punishment
device by either withholding the wages arbitrarily or unfairly
fining workers.209
3. Unsafe Workplace Environments
Employment law requires employers to provide workers
with a safe work environment. 210 Further, employers are
expected to train workers for tasks that require specialized
training or qualifications to ensure workers’ safety.211
Factories in China are notorious for exposing their workers
to exceedingly dangerous or unhealthy working conditions.212
One report in particular found that pneumoconiosis (a/k/a
black lung disease), which has no cure, is one of the most
prevalent occupational diseases in China.213 The report revealed
that in 2010, black lung disease caused over 149,000 deaths and

supra note 202, at 18 (stating that some workers had to work excessively long hours just
to get CNY¥1417 per month, which equates to approximately US$227).
208. See Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 202, at 18 (discussing how 14.4% of
workers were owed back pay and 37.6% of workers had not been fully paid for working
overtime hours); see also Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse, supra note 194, at 3 (reporting that
some factories failed to pay workers in a timely manner or failed to pay them for
overtime hours).
209. See Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 202, at 19 (discussing how some
employers withheld one and a half months’ worth of wages from workers to prevent
them from quitting or leaving); see also Mattel’s Unceasing Abuse, supra note 194, at 4
(discussing how one factory withholds wages from workers for checking their cell
phones).
210. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 32, art. 52 (stating that employers must establish
workplace standards that meeting occupational safety and health standards).
211. Id. art. 55 (“Labourers to be engaged in specialized operations must receive
specialized training and acquire qualifications for such special operations.”).
212 . See Time to Pay the Bill, CHINA LABOUR BULL. 4 (2013), http://
www.clb.org.hk/en/sites/default/files/File/research_reports/Time%20to%20Pay%
20the%20Bill.pdf (discussing how China’s government has ignored the epidemic of
black lung disease running rampant through their workforce); see also TRAGEDIES OF
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 110 (“More significantly, investigations revealed that
for the majority of job posts in electronics factories, there is a high risk of contraction
of occupational illnesses and diseases.”).
213. See Time to Pay the Bill, supra note 212, at 4 (discussing the black lung disease
epidemic among workers in China).
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additionally infected over 500,000 persons.214 Further, in 2009
over one hundred workers were poisoned from working with a
dangerous chemical used to help clean iPhone touchscreens.215
Some of these workers were hospitalized for up to nine months
after the incident yet still suffer from “weak limbs and other
health problems.” 216 In 2011, two factories in China that
manufacture products for Apple exploded due to the build-up
of aluminum dust in the factory area.217 At one of these factories,
Apple’s inspectors were onsite just hours before the explosion
occurred and spent a total of ten minutes examining the site.218
Workers in some of the factories face conditions that could
be physically debilitating or exhausting. The act of standing in
an assembly line while repeating the same action “every three
seconds . . . for ten consecutive hours” 219 has caused some
214. See id. (“The cumulative total, since the [Ministry of Health] started keeping
records of pneumoconiosis in China in the 1950s, reached 676,541, with 149,110
deaths and 527,431 people still suffering from the disease at the end of 2010.”).
215. See Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (“Two years ago, 137 workers at an Apple
supplier in eastern China were injured after they were ordered to use a poisonous
chemical to clean iPhone screens.”).
216. See Apple and Foxconn Are Lying and Calling the Kettle Black, STUDENTS &
SCHOLARS AGAINST CORP. MISBEHAVIOR (Mar. 18, 2012, 11:24 PM), http://sacom.hk/
apple-and-foxconn-are-lying-and-calling-the-kettle-black/ (reporting that many of the
over one hundred workers poisoned from using a chemical to clean iPhones continue
to suffer from health problems).
217. See David Barboza, Explosion at Apple Supplier Caused by Dust, China Says, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
24,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/technology/
25foxconn.html?_r=0 (discussing how an explosion in a factory in China stemmed from
combustible dust); see also John Brownlee, Both Foxconn iPad 2 Factories Exploded for the
Same Reason, CULTOFMAC.COM (Dec. 20, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://www.cultofmac.com/
136398/both-foxconn-ipad-2-factories-exploded-for-the-same-reason/ (discussing how
two explosions caused by a build-up of aluminum dust occurred in iPad factories in
China within the span of one year).
218. See Josh Ong, Apple Reportedly Performed Safety Inspections Hours Before 2011
iPad Factory Blast, APPLE INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://appleinsider.com/
articles/12/03/13/apple_reportedly_performed_safety_inspections_hours_before_
2011_ipad_factory_blast (discussing how workers reported that Apple inspectors briefly
examined one of its supply-chain factories in Shanghai just hours before the factory
exploded); see also Charles Cooper, Injured Shanghai Workers Say Apple Visited Factory
Hours Before Explosion, CNET (Mar. 12, 2012, 4:52 AM), http://news.cnet.com/830113579_3-57395222-37/injured-shanghai-workers-say-apple-visited-factory-hours-beforeexplosion (“Workers injured in a December blast at a Chinese factory say that Apple
inspectors toured the facility hours before the accident.”).
219. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 28, at 109 (“For example, on
the HP production line, workers must complete an action every three seconds and
repeat this for ten consecutive hours.”).
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workers’ legs to “swell until they can hardly walk.”220 In one
factory, workers have reportedly lost or broken about 40,000
fingers while on the job every year.221
4. The Use of Child Labor
China has ratified ILO’s Convention Nos. 138 and 182,
both of which prohibit the use of child labor.222 Despite this,
MNCs like Wal-Mart and Disney have been accused of
contracting with factories in China that use child labor to
manufacture best-selling toy products.223 The use of child labor
was also discovered in factories that produce electronic products
for Apple and Samsung.224 In some cases, the children employed
in these factories were as young as fourteen.225

220. See Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 3 (“Some say they stand so long that their
legs swell until they can hardly walk.”).
221. See Barboza, supra note 29 (reporting that “factory workers lose or break
about 40,000 fingers on the job every year”).
222 . International Labour Organisation, Convetion (No. 138) Concerning
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment art. 1, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297
(requiring member states to effectively abolish the use of child labor); International
Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention art. 1, June 17,
1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (insisting that member states “take immediate and effective
measure to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor as
a matter of urgency.”).
223. See David Barboza, Despite a Decade of Criticism, Worker Abuse Persists in China,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/business/
worldbusiness/04iht-sweatshop.4.9028448.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing how
some factories that supply products to Wal-Mart, Dell, and Disney were accused of
using child labor); see also Gethin Chamberlain, Disney Factory Faces Probe into Sweatshop
Suicide Claims, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Aug. 27, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/law/2011/aug/27/disney-factory-sweatshop-suicide-claims
(describing how Disney has recently been accused of using child labor to make one of
its best-selling toys).
224. See Juliette Garside, Child Labour Uncovered in Apple’s Supply Chain, GUARDIAN
(U.K.) (Jan. 25, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jan/
25/apple-child-labour-supply (reporting that one company in China that produces
products for Apple employed seventy-four children under the age of sixteen); see also
Avram Piltch, Samsung Investigating Alleged Child Labor Abuse at Chinese Factory, YAHOO
(Aug. 7, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/samsung-investigating-alleged-childlabor-abuse-chinese-factory-165148947.html (summarizing a report from CLW detailing
how Chinese factories that manufacture products for Samsung uses child labor).
225. See Piltch, supra note 224 (stating that some of the workers in the factory
were as young as fourteen).
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5. “Second-Class” Workers
Non-compliance with employment laws is even more
exacerbated when employers recruit workers through
intermediaries. 226 China’s laws state that organizations and
individuals are prohibited from using intermediaries as a way to
bypass compliance with employment laws.227 For example, some
employers hire dispatched workers and require them to work
sixteen-hour days for less pay.228 Some employers bar dispatched
workers from joining unions. 229 Further, intermediaries also
treat their employees like second-class workers by requiring
them to take on more work-intensive responsibilities in
exchange for a lower wage and fewer benefits.230
B. The Inadequacy of China’s Unions in Representing Workers’
Interests
The ILO Declaration on Social Justice considers the
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining as
indispensable to its four strategic objectives.231 The Tripartite
Declaration also encourages governments to ratify Conventions
87 and 98, which respectively recognize the right to freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining.232
226. See CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN, supra note 30, at 8–9 (finding
that factories use dispatched workers to shift responsibility for worker injuries, prevent
workers from unionizing, and to avoid limits on overtime); see also Roberts, supra note
84 (discussing how employers are frequently using dispatched workers in order to avoid
complying with employment laws).
227. Employment Promotion Law, supra note 61, art. 39 (“All organizations and
individuals are prohibited from infringing on the legitimate rights and interests of the
workers by taking advantage of their intermediary activities for employment.”).
228. See Roberts, supra note 84 (reporting that dispatched workers work long
hours and are paid “three-quarters the wage earned” by other workers).
229. See id. (reporting that dispatched workers at a factory that makes products for
Nokio are not permitted to join the official union).
230. See CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN, supra note 30, at 11 (stating
that dispatched workers’ “wages are lower, their benefits are worse, and the intensity of
their work is much greater”); see also Roberts, supra note 84 (finding that some
dispatched workers are paid less and worked harder).
231. See ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, supra note 150,
at 11 (discussing how the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining
are essential to achieving its four strategic objectives).
232 . See ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, supra note 157, para. 9 (encouraging governments to
adopt Convention Nos. 87 and 98).
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The 2001 TUL requires labor unions to protect and
advocate for workers’ rights and interests. 233 China, however,
represses the formation of any labor union outside of the
government-endorsed national union—the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”).234 Since the ACFTU essentially
operates under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
(“CCP”), the union is expected to not only represent the best
interests of the workers, but also to factor in the best interests of
the state.235 For example, in accordance with China’s focus on
maintaining a harmonious society, the ACFTU lacks the
authority to organize or call for a strike.236 In fact, labor unions
established under the ACFTU lack the power to initiate any sort
of collective action and act primarily to control the actions of
workers rather than to advocate their interests.237
After a labor strike erupted in China in 2013, for instance,
the ACFTU responded by only issuing statements of “concern
and support.”238 Generally, workers in factories in the country
233. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions of
the 2001 TUL).
234. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 59 (arguing that “China’s failure to
recognize freedom of association outside of the official union, the [ACFTU] and its
continued repression of independent union organizing” remain problematic); see also
Brown, supra note 124, at 51–52 (discussing how the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions (“AFCTU”) has close ties to the Chinese Communist Party and continues to
remain the “exclusive trade union in China”).
235. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60 (“First, because all Chinese unions
operate under the leadership of the Party, their primary allegiance is to state
interests . . . .”); see also Brown, supra note 124, at 52 (discussing how the ACFTU must
play a dual role and struggles between being more active in advocating and
representing employees’ interests and being responsive to the state’s interest in
maintaining social stability).
236. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60–61 (discussing how unions in China lack
the authority to initiate collective action); see also Biddulph, supra note 56, at 48
(discussing how unions in China are “part of the institutional infrastructure
constructed to preserve stability”).
237. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60–61 (stating that unions generally lack the
authority to initiate collective action or call a strike); see also Brown, supra note 124, at
55 (noting the idea the “predominant function” of unions in China is to manage
workers rather than to advocate for their rights).
238. See Han Dongfang, Han Dongfang Discusses the Fast Emerging Labour Movement
in China, CHINA LABOUR BULL., Sep. 6, 2013, http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/handongfang-discusses-fast-emerging-labour-movement-china (reporting that the official
union is “limited to issuing statements of concern and support” to workers after a
recent strike occurred); see also Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 61 (stating that trade
unions tend to “retreat where [a labor dispute] may lead to collective action”).
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are unaware of the purpose of a union as well as of whether
unions exist in their factory at all.239 Even in cases where a
worker is aware of the existence of a union, the worker harbors
serious doubts about the union’s ability to act as an effective
advocate for workers’ rights.240
C. BITs and How They Favor MNC Investors Over States and People
The decision to negotiate a US-China BIT was met with
mixed reactions. 241 Some responded to these negotiations
positively, noting that a BIT between two of the world’s largest
economies would not only help protect the flow of FDI between
the United States and China but further would improve global
economics overall.242 Others have been more hesitant, warning
that a quickly hashed out deal between the United States and
China could have serious repercussions in the environmental,
investment, and labor fields. 243 Notably, the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
(“AFL-CIO”), the largest federation of labor unions in the
United States, opposed the revival of a US-China BIT because
239. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60 (describing how workers were unaware of
the purpose or relevance of unions); see also CHINA LABOR WATCH, BEYOND FOXCONN,
supra note 30, at 7 (“Most workers are not familiar with unions and their functions.”).
240. See Harper Ho, supra note 31, at 60 (discussing how workers generally view
unions as “irrelevant as a source of effective representation”); see also Brown, supra note
124, at 55 (describing how the understanding of labor unions as a vehicle for
enhancing workers’ rights is an unorthodox, even unfamiliar concept in China).
241. Compare Bourassa, supra note 26 (stating that a US-China BIT is beneficial for
the United States, China, and the global economy), with Celeste Drake, A BIT With
China Is the Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, AFL-CIO NOW (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation/A-BIT-with-China-Is-theWrong-Solution-to-the-Wrong-Problem (warning that a BIT between the United States
and China “is likely to cause further harm to U.S.-based producers and America’s
working families”).
242. See EVALUATING A POTENTIAL US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY:
BACKGROUND, CONTEXT, AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 27, at 43 (discussing how a USChina BIT could be positive and increase the flow of investment between the two
states); see also Bourassa, supra note 26 (“A BIT between the world’s two largest
economies . . . will not only be good for the United States and China, but also for the
global economy.”).
243. See Sarah Anderson, Memo to US: Only Fools Rush In, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (March
21, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/
mar/18/china-usforeignpolicy (stating that a BIT may give investors too much power
vis-a-vis the state); see also Drake, supra note 241 (arguing that the move to create a BIT
with China may make it “exacerbate, rather than improve labor abuses in China”).
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BITs have historically provided inadequate protections for
workers’ rights.244 Specifically, the AFL-CIO argues that the US
Model BIT fails to “effectively protect fundamental labor rights,”
which may make it easier for MNCs in China to further
aggravate existing labor abuses.245
Further, BITs are primarily investor-oriented instruments in
that they were devised to give MNCs an avenue through which to
initiate arbitration proceedings against a state.246 The framework
for existing BITs also grants investors stronger rights and
protections in relation to a state.247 For example, the US Model
BIT contains a most-favored-nation clause that promises
investors “treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to investors of any non-Party.”248 In other words,
under this clause an investor could claim greater rights than the
ones agreed to by the state-parties.249 Some investors have used
BITs to hold host states economically liable for any depreciation
in the value of their investment, even in cases where an
arbitration proceeding could impair the provision of public
services like water, sewage management, electricity, waste, oil,
and mining.250
244. See Drake, supra note 241 (discussing how a US-China BIT would impair
workers rights because of the inadequate protections provided by BITs).
245. Id. (opposing a US-China BIT because the current US Model BIT provides
ineffective protection for workers’ rights).
246. See Schill, supra note 181, at 87 (“[M]ost BITs provide the covered investors
with a unilateral right to initiate arbitral proceedings against the host country . . . .”);
see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 489 (describing how most BIT disputes are initiated by
investors against states).
247. See Dr. Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A
Critique, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 131, 147 (2013) (describing how BITs give out-of-state
investors greater rights in relation to in-state investors that could affect or limit the
regulatory authority of a state); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 488 (detailing different
provisions in BITs that provide strongly protect investors’ interests).
248. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 4 (outlining the specifics of the US
Model BIT’s most-favored-nation clause).
249. See id.
250. See Ofodile, supra note 247, at 148 (“Specifically, there are concerns that
‘[s]ome investors are using bilateral investment treaties to challenge treatment of
foreign investments in various sensitive areas, including water and sewage provisions,
oil and gas exploitation and mining concessions.’”); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at
496 (“According to a 2007 study of concluded and pending ICSID cases, the majority of
cases involved either basic public services or energy resources: 42 percent involved
water, electricity, telecoms, and waste management, and 29 percent involved oil, gas,
and mining.”).
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In Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. Mexico, for example,
an MNC-investor initiated arbitration proceedings against
Mexico, claiming that the state’s refusal to renew its landfill
license was an illegal expropriation that violated an
international investment agreement.251 Mexico refused to renew
the license because the investor was storing excessive amounts of
waste, some of which were hazardous, within the landfill. 252
Although Mexico argued that their refusal was an exercise of the
state’s policing power “within the highly regulated and
extremely sensitive framework of environmental protection and
public health,” ICSID ordered the state to pay the MNC-investor
$5 million.253
The state of Tanzania went into arbitration for violating a
BIT provision after unilaterally terminating a water privatization
contract with an MNC-investor. 254 Six non-governmental
organizations filed a petition requesting to be granted amicus
curiae status in the arbitration proceedings, arguing that any
decision rendered by the ICSID tribunal critically affects
Tanzania’s local communities and their access to safe drinking
water. 255 More recently, a Hong Kong-based MNC initiated
arbitration proceedings possibly worth billions of US dollars
against Australia, challenging the state’s authority to pass new
laws designed to discourage people from smoking. 256 These
251. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. The United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 95–96 (May 29, 2003) (summarizing the
expropriation claims raised by the investor in the arbitration proceeding).
252. Id. ¶¶ 97–99 (summarizing the defense arguments raised by the state during
arbitration).
253. Id. ¶¶ 97, 201.
254. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 1, ¶¶ 1–13 (Mar. 31, 2006) (providing
background information on the dispute between Biwater Gauff and Tanzania).
255. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/22, Petition for Amicus Curiae Status, 7–8 (Nov. 27, 2006) (arguing that
this arbitration “goes far beyond merely resolving commercial or private conflicts, but
rather has a substantial influence on . . . basic human rights.”).
256. See Rob Taylor, Philip Morris Challenges Australia on Plain Pack, REUTERS (Nov.
20, 2011, 11:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-australiasmoking-idUSTRE7AK09H20111121 (reporting that Philip Morris initiated arbitration
proceedings against Australia, challenging the country’s new laws regulating tobacco
products); see also Investor-state Arbitration–Tobacco Plain Packaging, AUSTL. GOV’T ATT’YGEN.’S DEP’T, http://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging (last visited Mar. 1, 2014)
(summarizing the developments of the arbitration proceedings between Australia and
Philip Morris).
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cases show how MNC-investors have used BIT provisions to
challenge a state’s regulatory or policing power, even when the
state is acting in areas pertaining to health or the environment.
The use of private arbitration is also problematic because,
since cases are decided on an ad hoc basis, this leads to
uncertainty over what an MNC’s obligations are in relation to a
host state.257 The arbitrators used in these arbitrations have also
been criticized for being primarily investment-oriented and
inexperienced in the human rights area.258 This bias in favor of
investors is made worse by the fact that some arbitrators have
acted or later will act as legal counsel for the investors involved
in the dispute.259
Even in cases where a BIT does mention labor standards, it
does so using “preambular language.” 260 In other words,
although some BITs encourage states and MNCs to respect
workers’ rights, they impose no penalties or sanctions against

257. See Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights 24
(INEF Research Paper Series 03/2010), available at http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf
(describing how arbitrations brought under a BIT pose problems because of the
“irregularities and legal uncertainty” inherent in arbitration proceedings); see also
Sheffer, supra note 19, at 490 (discussing how, because arbitration decisions only bind
the parties, they fail to create a uniform standard of conduct among MNCs).
258. See Jacob, supra note 257, at 25 (“Most arbitrators that are selected by the
parties have commercial backgrounds and do not regularly deal with matters
pertaining to human rights law . . . .”); see also Sheffer, supra note 19, at 495 (describing
how arbitrators are required to have commercial and legal experience yet are usually
not familiar with human rights-related laws).
259. See Jacob, supra note 257, at 25-26 (discussing how arbitrators may be selfserving because they “frequently also act as counsel to parties in other cases”); see also
Drake, supra note 241 (arguing that arbitrators may be biased because the attorneys
who from the panels come from work in large, international law firms and, as such, are
“mouthpieces for global investors”).
260. See Jacob, supra note 257, at 11 (classifying BIT language addressing labor or
environmental standards as “preambular language”); see also Vid Prislan & Ruben
Zandvliet, Perspectives on Topical Foreign Direct investment issues by the Vale Columbia Center
on Sustainable International Investment, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES (April 1, 2013),
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/labor-provisions-bilateral-investment-treatiesdoes-new-us-model-bit-provide-template-future#_ftn1 (“The amendments to the 2012
Model represent a small but welcome step in bridging the divide between investment
law and public policy concerns . . . [b]ut it lacks a clear obligation to adopt and
maintain ILO standards as a minimum, and does not allow disputes to be submitted to
arbitration.”).
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these entities should a violation occur.261 For example, the US
Model BIT does not permit a state or an investor to bring
arbitrations claims under Article 13, the BIT’s sole provision that
addresses the significance of workers’ rights.262 If an issue arises
under Article 13, a party may only make a request for a
consultation meeting.263
The combination of China’s lax enforcement of labor and
employment laws, and BITs strong protections for investors,
both weigh against the rights of workers. Despite China’s
implementation of new labor and employment laws, widespread
abusive labor practices continue to persist. Further, unions are
constrained in their ability to adequately represent workers’
rights. Lastly, BITs and their focus on protecting the value of
FDI from MNC-investors can sometimes constrict a state’s
regulatory authority, making it more difficult for states to pass
new regulations or laws that to protect workers.
III. USING THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
AS A TOOL TO AFFIRMATIVELY HOLD MNCS LIABLE FOR
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Viewing BITs through a purely commercial lens ignores the
possibly detrimental effects that international investments may
have on a government’s regulatory authority and local
communities.264 The simple act of investing in another country
can create intimate ties between the signatory-states as well as
between the MNCs and the people in the state.265 Thus, even
though Apple may not be legally liable for labor violations
occurring within their supply-chain factories in China, this does
261. See US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 24 (permitting claims to be brought
under provisions that are more investor-oriented and barring claims from being
brought under provisions pertaining to labor or environmental standards).
262. Id. art. 24(a) (permitting claimants to submit an arbitration claim only if an
obligation under Articles 3 through 10 was breached).
263. Id. art. 13(4) (permitting a party to request a consultation should a “matter”
arise under Article 13).
264. See supra notes 19–25, 241–263 and accompanying text (detailing instances in
which MNCs have used BITs to protect their financial interests even if it constrains the
state’s ability to regulate in the health, environmental, or other areas).
265. See supra notes 251–255 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which an
MNC-investor’s arbitration suit against the state affected a communities’ access to safe
water or damaged the environment).
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necessarily mean that Apple is entirely blameless. BITs can serve
as the connective bridge between the commercial sphere and
the human rights sphere, ensuring that there is an avenue
through which to hold MNCs legally liable for permitting or
blatantly ignoring the use of abusive labor practices.
Part III.A argues that clauses can easily be strengthened in
existing model BITs to provide greater protections for workers’
rights. Next, Part III.B argues that incorporating stronger
clauses for labor standards levels the playing field between
investors and states in a BIT arbitration. Lastly, Part III.C argues
that BITs are a practical and effective way to ensure that MNCs
respect and protect labor rights, regardless of where these labor
violations occur.
A. Changing the Language of BITS to Address and Protect the State’s
Right and Obligation to Protect Workers
The US Model BIT fails to include provisions that give
parties the right to bring arbitration claims against a state or
investor for violating a worker’s rights.266 Further, the US Model
BIT does not have provisions immunizing a state from liability
should the state pass new laws or policies that further protects
workers’ rights and interests.267
The US Model BIT already has provisions that protect states
from being subjected to arbitration proceedings for passing
regulations pertaining to environmental concerns. 268 Further,
the US Model BIT contains provisions protecting the state’s
right to act in matters relating to financial stability.269 Article 20
266. See supra notes 260–263 and accompanying text (describing the provisions in
the US Model BIT that briefly address labor rights).
267. See supra notes 260–263 and accompanying text (describing the US Model
BIT’s labor provisions).
268. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 12. (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that
investing activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns.”).
269 . US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, art. 20 (“Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Treaty, a Party shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining
measures relating to financial services for prudential reasons, including for the
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty
is owed by a financial services supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the
financial system.”).
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provides that a state-party “shall not be prevented from adopting
or maintaining measures relating to . . . the integrity and
stability of the financial system.”270 In other words, both these
provisions protect a state’s right to pass new laws or regulations
about the environment or the financial sector by shielding them
from incurring liability to an investor under a BIT.
A US-China BIT should include similar language pertaining
to labor rights. Specifically, a US-China BIT should place
affirmative obligations on MNCs and states to respect workers’
rights as well as safeguard a state’s authority to pass new
employment laws or regulations. Further, these provisions
should grant investors and states the option to bring arbitration
claims in cases where a labor violation does occur.
B. Incorporating Labor Standards into BITs Will Even the Playing
Field Between the State and MNC-Investors
The current international investment regime is biased
towards protecting investors without providing equally strong
provisions safeguarding a state’s power to regulate.271 Currently,
many standard BITs include investor-oriented clauses such as
national treatment provisions, fair and equitable treatment
provisions, and expropriation provisions. 272 These clauses
guarantee that an investor’s rights are protected against
arbitrary or discriminatory treatment at the hands of a state.273
Further, arbitrators in BIT arbitrations are only expected to be
experts in the commercial area.274 These favorable provisions for
investors have made it easier to essentially freeze states from
passing any new measures relating to regulating the

270. See id.
271. Compare supra notes 174–192 and accompanying text (describing how BITs
contain provisions protecting investor’s rights and granting them minimum
protections), with supra notes 241–263 (discussing how MNC-investors have used BITs
hold states liable for any depreciation in an investment’s value).
272 . See supra notes 174–192 and accompanying text (outlining how BIT
provisions protect investors).
273. See supra notes 174–192 and accompanying text
274. See supra notes 257–259 and accompanying text (discussing how arbitrators
in BIT arbitrations usually come from the investment sphere).
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environment, labor standards, or other areas of public interest
out of fear of being forced to pay enormous an arbitral award.275
Including stronger state-oriented clauses in BITs that
protect a state’s authority to regulate can help correct this
imbalance. Some BITs already have provisions relating to areas
of public interest, like protecting the stability of financial
institutions or preserving the environment. 276 Strengthening
provisions relating to labor standards will not, as some might say,
be “counterproductive” to trade policy by “inhibit[ing]
countries like China . . . from actually concluding bilateral
investment treaties with the United States.” 277 Instead, it
provides states with more bargaining power against MNC
investors in the international investment game and gives states
the flexibility needed to regulate in sensitive public interest
areas.
C. The Practicality of Including Mandatory Obligations in BITs
Requiring MNCs to Respect Worker’s Rights
China already has a history of turning a blind-eye to the
abusive labor practices used in some of their factories.278 China
has attempted to ameliorate these practices through changing
their labor and employment laws, but these changes are more
easily made on paper rather than in practice.279 Further, the
ACFTU remains mostly ineffectual when it comes to
encouraging workers to engage in collective action or bringing
about any substantive change.280
Embedding labor standards into BITs may be more
practicable and feasible than advocating for more widespread
275. See supra notes 21–25, 251–256 and accompanying text (describing how
MNC-investors have brought claims valued at millions of dollars against states).
276. US MODEL BIT, supra note 191, arts. 12, 20 (stating that a state’s right to pass
laws regulating environmental standards or the financial sector is protected).
277. Doug Palmer, U.S. Resolves 3-year Debate on Investment Treaty Terms, CHI. TRIB.,
April 20, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-20/news/sns-rt-us-usainvestment-treatiesbre83j15l-20120420_1_treaties-foreign-investment-labor-groups.
278 . See supra notes 195–240 and accompanying text (detailing the labor
violations and abuses that occur in China’s factories and workplaces).
279. Compare supra notes 56–140 and accompanying text (describing the changes
to China’s labor and employment laws made in the 2000s), with supra notes 195–240
(detailing the labor violations and abuses that continue to occur in China’s factories).
280. See supra note 231–240 and accompanying text (discussing the limits on the
ACFTU to represent workers’ rights).
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changes in China’s labor policies. 281 Considering China’s
prohibition on the establishment of any independent trade
union outside of the ACFTU, it is difficult for any real and
adequate worker representation to occur. 282 Including nonderogation labor provisions in BITs, however, subtly integrates
stronger labor standards into China from without its borders.
Further, facing possible arbitration proceedings and the threat
of an excessive arbitral award could further motivate the state to
raise their labor standards. 283 Most significantly, including
provisions in a BIT requiring states to not derogate from
international labor standards provides MNCs and states a basis
from which to file an arbitration claim. As an illustration, during
the Apple-Foxconn scandal, Apple could have initiated
arbitration proceedings against China for permitting these labor
violations to occur in their supply-chain factories. Although
Apple may only be able to recover monetary damages, of the two
actors who should be held accountable for the scandal, this
method at least holds one of them liable. This example also
works when switched: a state may initiate an arbitration
proceeding against a, MNC-investor for investing into factories
that have violated relevant labor or employment laws.
CONCLUSION
Increasing globalization combined with the strict
compartmentalization of issues into commercial and noncommercial areas have complicated the interactions between
investments and human rights. The current international
investment regime, spearheaded by MNCs, can no longer cling
to their myopic blinders that focus purely on matters of
economics, finance, and profit. In the end, the increasing
number of BITs will inevitably increase the flow of FDI between
states and MNCs. This will further blur the line demarcating
where state liability ends and where MNC responsibility begins.
281. See supra notes 195–230 and accompanying text (describing how, despite the
changes in China’s employment laws, abusive labor practices continue to pervade
Chinese factories).
282. See supra notes 231–240 and accompanying text (describing the ACFTU).
283. See supra notes 19–25, 251–256 and accompanying text (discussing cases
where investors brought arbitration proceedings against states and were awarded
enormous arbitral awards).
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Including stronger labor rights-oriented provisions in a USChina BIT can provide a preemptive answer to these future
issues. BITs can help establish a governing code of conduct that
legally and financially binds the actions of states and MNCs as
well as the actions of their affiliates.
Additionally, MNCs and their increasingly global activities
make it more difficult to regulate them uniformly across all state
lines. Like the Multilateral Agreement on Investments and its
subsequent failure, an effort to create some sort of universal,
standardized document establishing standards of conduct for all
MNCs operating in any jurisdiction may prove impossible. Yet,
similar to how the international investment sphere developed,
the creation of widely recognized standards on corporate social
responsibility for MNCs can advance on a bilateral basis.
Although it may be slow to have this movement proceed treaty
by treaty, this method provides room for experimentation while
simultaneously giving proper respect to each state’s individual
and unique characteristics.

